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1. Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). For a
discussion of this opinion, see Section V, infra.
2. Brown v. Neff, 603 N.Y.S.2d 707, 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). In Brown v. Neff, a passenger who
had been injured in a truck accident sued an automobile repair shop for his injuries, alleging negligence,
breach of warranty, and misrepresentation related to the repair shop’s safety inspection. The repair shop
moved to dismiss the warranty and misrepresentation claims based on a lack of privity. The trial court
agreed and dismissed the warranty claim but allowed the misrepresentation claim to go forward. It
concluded that privity was not essential to a cause of action for “intentional or negligent misrepresentation
involving the risk of physical harm” under §§ 310 and 311 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
Those sections, including § 310 comments c and d, and § 311 comment b, “make it plain that the offending
party may be liable not only to the party in privity but also to those whom the misrepresenter should realize
are likely to be imperiled.” See Brown, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 709–10.
3. David G. Owen, Symposium, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 965
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CONTE v. WYETH: CAVEAT INNOVATOR
AND THE CASE FOR PERPETUAL
LIABILITY IN DRUG LABELING
Martin A. Ramey*
[O]ne who misrepresents for his gain and benefit at the expense of human life should be
answerable in fraud for all the reasonable and foreseeable consequences of his
deception.1
—Justice Parbin in Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. (1950)
Liability for intentional or negligent misrepresentations which threaten physical harm
is grounded upon a duty which is coextensive with the foreseeable risk.2
—Justice Walter J. Relihan, Jr. in Brown v. Neff (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the citadel of privity first crumbled for manufacturers of defective
products decades ago, state and federal courts have expanded the foundations
of products liability law to include not only purchasers as plaintiffs but
“ultimate” bystanders under notions of reasonableness, foreseeability and risk
allocation.  During this time, products such as drugs, blood products and3
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(2007); see also Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 n.4 (1955) (noting privity as
required by Winterbotten v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) was abandoned
beginning with Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903)); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d
693 (1946).
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6, Liability of Commercial
Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (1998).
5. See Reports Received and Reports Entered Into AERS by Year as of June 30, 2009, Food and
Drug Administration (2009), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070434.htm (showing number of adverse events received by FDA’s
AER [adverse event reporting] system by year).
6. See, e.g., Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 89, 107 (Cal. App. 2008); see generally Mark
D. Shifton, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—The ALI’s Cure for Prescription Drug
Liability, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2343, 2359–81 (2002); see also Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App.
medical devices have come to be viewed as distinct from other commodities,
particularly with the coming of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability.4
Indeed, there is good reason for treating drugs and devices differently
from automobiles, power tools and toys. For starters, drugs and medical
devices treat disease and save countless lives. Drugs, in particular, are highly
regulated throughout all stages of the product life cycle, imposing complex
obligations on manufacturers that endure from the cradle of design to the
drug’s ultimate demise in the market. For example, before drug compounds
may ever be tested in human subjects, they must be thoroughly investigated
under approval of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Before
a specific drug may be sold, its manufacturer must conduct several phases of
clinical trials, each intensifying in scope, and submit literally tens of
thousands of pages of results to the FDA as evidence of a drug’s safety and
efficacy. Even then, the FDA must still approve all labeling for each drug,
including a review of company advertising. No other line of consumer
products manufactured today bears such heavy regulatory burdens.
But, despite this regulation and their admittedly immense contributions,
it is also true that drugs and devices may occasionally cause serious and
permanent harm in some patients.  Accordingly, products liability law has5
adapted to create special notions of defect, duty and evidence seeking to
balance the utility of these life-saving products with the rights of patients to
recover for injuries from them. In many ways, the evolution of our products
liability law with respect to drugs and devices can be characterized by
constant choices between these competing policies.6
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2d 680, 683 (holding publisher liable for representations in its publication as to quality of another
manufacturer’s product stating “. . . we are influenced more by public policy than by whether such cause
of action can be comfortably fitted into one of the law’s traditional categories of liability.”).
7. It is not uncommon in failure to warn cases for plaintiffs’ lawyers to include health care
providers as defendants under the theory that if a sufficient warning were provided, failure to adhere to that
warning is a violation of the standard of care. In other cases, plaintiffs may seek to include providers to
defeat diversity jurisdiction and keep the case in state court. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Estate of
Heffner, 904 So. 2d 100 (Miss. 2004).
8. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (U.S. 2009); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ernst, 296
S.W.3d 81, 95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009) (“General causation describes whether a substance
is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while specific causation
describes whether a substance caused a particular individual’s injury.”); In re New York County DES
Litigation, 211 A.D.2d 500 (N.Y.A.D. 1995) (noting reverse bifurcation, where damages are tried first, is
not an “improvident exercise of [judicial] discretion”).
9. For example, recent settlements include the Vioxx products liability litigation estimated at $4.85
billion; the Vytorin/Zetia marketing, sales practices and products liability litigation at $41.5 million; and
the Bextra and Celebrex products liability litigation at $894 million, among others.
Over the last 40 years, litigation of pharmaceutical product liability cases
has grown more complex. Because such products are inextricably linked to the
delivery of health care, cases against drug manufacturers are often overlaid
with procedural and substantive laws governing medical malpractice.  Recent7
decisions have also considered the scope of preemption of the Food Drug &
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) over state tort law and the availability of reverse
bifurcation and mini-trials devoted to issues of general and specific causation
as a means of resolving difficult scientific and medical questions.  Today,8
pharmaceutical “mass torts” are routinely consolidated and resolved or
disposed of by state and federal judges throughout the country, who often
work in cooperation with one another.
In this litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys have also named pharmacies and
physicians as parties alleging claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranties, battery, fraud, negligent misrepresentation as well as violations of
state unfair business and deceptive practices laws. And, in cases involving
generic drugs, plaintiffs have sued not only the generic manufacturer but the
manufacturer of the original medication, often referred to as the “brand name
manufacturer,” “innovator” or “pioneer.”
As any litigation goes, there has been a natural ebb and flow to victories
on either side. Occasionally, along comes a major decision that changes the
landscape and grabs headlines, but rarely does the decision do more than alter
the particular strategy of each side. Pharmaceutical mass torts, after all, are
like the industry they are based upon—big business.  This article discusses9
one of these recent cases.
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10. Conte v. Wyeth, 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008); see Bridget M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris,
Brand Name Exposure for Generic Drug Use: Prescription for Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767 (2009).
The authors describe Conte as a “sea change,” turning “products liability on its head.” Id. at 788.
11. Id. at 788; Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann, Scorecard: Non-Manufacturer, Brand Name
Defendants in Generic Drug Cases, Drug and Device Law Blog (Nov. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Beck &
Herrmann, Scorecard], http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/search/label/Conte.
12. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (finding preemption of state tort claims against
device manufacturers by FDCA for Class III medical devices approved through the Premarket Approval
(PMA) process).
13. Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann, Closing the Arguments on Conte, Drug and Device Law Blog
(Jan. 22, 2009), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/search/label/Conte. However, on January 21, 2009,
the California Supreme Court denied review of the decision (Cal. Supreme Court case no. S169116).
14. See Beck & Herrmann, Scorecard, supra note 11.
II. CONTE V. WYETH
In November 2008, the Court of Appeal for California’s First District
held that a manufacturer of a brand name drug could be liable to a plaintiff for
injuries she suffered after ingesting the generic form of the medication. This
was so even though the plaintiff never took the brand name medication.
Instead, the court predicated liability on the basis that the manufacturer had
misrepresented or omitted material facts in its original label to the FDA.
Because her physician had relied upon that label previously to prescribe the
medication to patients, the brand name manufacturer was held liable for its
negligent misrepresentations even though a pharmacist later filled the
prescription with a generic medication that carried the same label and
warnings as the brand name. Prior to this decision, it had been routinely
accepted that a pioneer could not be liable to a patient injured solely by a drug
manufactured by a generic competitor.
However, the case of Conte v. Wyeth shook that foundation and made
legal headlines, causing great consternation within the pharmaceutical
industry.  Some described the ruling as “aberrant” and as the worst judicial10
decision of 2008.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, on the other hand, especially those11
presiding over large mass tort inventories, were re-energized by the expansive
decision following an earlier setback in preemption of device claims by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Riegel v. Medtronic in early 2008.  Still, many12
commentators were quick to note that Conte was an anomaly within just one
California circuit and, as such, that its precedential value was limited.13
Despite that spin and the accompanying doomsday predictions of an
unraveling of products liability law, the vast majority of post-Conte courts
examining the same issue have refused to embrace its logic.  Rather, they14
cling to a case that preceded Conte by 14 years from the Fourth Circuit, Foster
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15. Foster v. American Home Products Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
16. GERD, also known as acid reflux disease, occurs when gastric acid from the stomach goes up
into the esophagus, often causing inflammation of the esophagus. See Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Burning Question,
What Is GERD?, CNN (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/dailydose/11/19/gerd.info/
index.html.
17. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 94.
18. Dilip V. Jeste & Michael P. Caligiuri, Tardive Dyskinesia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 303
(2:1993).
19. P. Jay Pasricha et al., Drug Insight: From Disturbed Mobility to Disordered Movement—A
Review of the Clinical Benefits and Medicolegal Risks of Metoclopramide, 3 NATURE CLINICAL PRACTICE:
GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 138, 143 (Mar. 2006); Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 18, at 303.
20. See Pasricha et al., supra note 19, at 144. “The abnormal involuntary body movements that
characterize TD can produce serious psychosocial problems in patients suffering from this disorder. These
patients may be stigmatized. Particularly among outpatients, the shame, guilt, anxiety, and anger that these
symptoms can cause may result in depression.” Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 18, at 310.
21. Id. There is often noted improvement in 30 to 50% of patients following discontinuation. Id.
22. Id. at 143. According to estimates, as many as 25% remain permanently disabled.
v. American Home Products Corp., which held that a brand name
manufacturer owes no duty of care to users of a generic medication.15
Nonetheless, these post-Conte decisions should not be read as suggesting that
Conte’s analysis is unsound. Instead, this author argues that Conte is founded
upon traditional tort principles that have been widely accepted for decades. As
such, it deserves its fair place in the sun.
A. Conte—The Facts
For almost four years, Elizabeth Conte took the generic drug
metoclopramide to treat symptoms associated with gastrointestinal esophageal
reflux disease (GERD).  As a result of that treatment, she developed a16
debilitating and permanent neurological condition known as tardive
dyskinesia.  Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological condition that causes17
involuntary bodily movements of the mouth, face, limbs and occasionally, the
trunk.  High-risk groups include many of the patients for whom the18
medication was intended: the elderly, females and diabetics.  For those19
afflicted with the disorder, it can be socially devastating and even life-
threatening.  There is no known, reliable treatment, although in some patients20
discontinued use of suspect medications may result in an improvement of
symptoms.  For others like Elizabeth Conte, it is permanent.21 22
Although Conte brought suit alleging products liability claims against the
generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, she also sued the brand name
drug’s manufacturer, Wyeth. However, her claims against Wyeth were not
product-related. Rather, the claims against Wyeth sounded in fraud and
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23. The Physicians’ Desk Reference is a commercially published reference containing prescribing
information for prescription drugs. Ahmman & Verneris, supra note 10, at 776. It is published annually by
Thompson Medical Economics with two supplements and is distributed free to physicians. Morlino v.
Medical Center of Ocean County, 684 A.2d 944, 945 n.1 (N.J. Super. 1996).
24. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 99 n.6.
25. Id. at 94.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 102.
29. Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 1112–13 (Cal. 1996).
misrepresentation arising from Wyeth’s statements in and omissions from its
original Reglan® label as it had been submitted to the FDA and publishers of
the Physicians’ Desk Reference years before.23
To buttress her claims, Conte argued that her prescribing doctor testified
during deposition that he would have relied upon the Physicians’ Desk
Reference during his residency when he began prescribing Reglan® to his
patients.  He also testified that he never interacted with anyone on the part of24
the generic manufacturers concerning metoclopramide nor relied upon any of
their labels or prescribing information. Additionally, he lacked any
information about whose drug would actually be used to fill his prescription.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both the generic
manufacturers and Wyeth. As to the generics, the court granted their argument
that their liability was preempted by the FDCA and dismissed the claims
because Conte’s physician had not relied on any of their warnings or product
labeling.  As to Wyeth, who did not join in the generic manufacturers’25
preemption argument, the court held that Wyeth owed no duty to the plaintiff
when she had taken only generic versions of the product.26
On appeal, the court reversed the trial court’s holding as to Wyeth’s
potential liability for negligent misrepresentations under California law and
affirmed dismissal of the claims against the generic manufacturers for Conte’s
failure to prove reliance.  Interestingly, Wyeth had argued that Conte’s27
reliance on misrepresentation as a viable cause of action was merely as a
surrogate to an otherwise non-availing products liability claim, as Wyeth had
not manufactured the product that Conte ingested. But the court disagreed,
noting that negligence-based fault standards for failure to warn claims are
distinct from those based on strict liability.  Citing to Carlin v. Superior28
Court,  a case where the California Supreme Court held a drug manufacturer29
may be liable in strict liability even though its actions were within the
standard of care, the court noted:
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30. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 101–02.
[F]ailure to warn in strict liability differs markedly from failure to warn in the negligence
context. Negligence law in a failure-to-warn case requires a plaintiff to prove that a
manufacturer or distributor did not warn of a particular risk for reasons which fell below
the acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have
known and warned about. Strict liability is not concerned with the standard of due care
or the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct. The rules of strict liability require a
plaintiff to prove only that the defendant did not adequately warn of a particular risk that
was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific
and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution. Thus, in
strict liability, as opposed to negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant’s failure to
warn is immaterial.
Stated another way, a reasonably prudent manufacturer might reasonably decide that the
risk of harm was such as not to require a warning as, for example if the manufacturer’s
own testing showed a result contrary to that of others in the scientific community. Such
a manufacturer might escape liability under negligence principles. In contrast, under strict
liability principles the manufacturer has no such leeway; the manufacturer is liable if it
failed to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time
it manufactured or distributed the product.’ [Citation.] Similarly, a manufacturer could
not escape liability under strict liability principles merely because its failure to warn of
a known or reasonably scientifically knowable risk conformed to an industry-wide
practice of failing to provide warnings that constituted the standard of reasonable care.30
Thus, to understand how Conte could deviate from what had been
commonly accepted by other courts to this point as the rule in generic-only
cases, one must accept the premise that a claim alleging negligent
misrepresentation remains independently viable from any product liability-
related claims. Some will, in no doubt, argue that Conte’s premise merely
disguises what is otherwise a products liability claim orchestrated to increase
the number of defendants and deep pockets. However, Conte seems to have
invalidated that argument: both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the
generics for want of reliance. If one were able to preserve the trial court’s
ruling, then plaintiffs like Conte would be without any remedy for what is an
inaccurate and misleading label simply because of the way that
pharmaceuticals are manufactured and marketed. Brand name manufacturers
would have no liability for want of a purchase of their product. Furthermore,
generics could never induce reliance since they generally do not market their
drugs to prescribers or patients. In essence, to view Conte as a products
liability case would leave plaintiffs like Elizabeth Conte without any remedy.
To analyze the propriety of Conte, one must view it as a misrepresentation
case.
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31. Christopher Kenney, MD, et al., Metoclopramide, An Increasingly Recognized Cause of Tardive
Dyskinesia, 48 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 379, 381 (2008).
32. Pasricha et al., supra note 19, at 139.
33. Id. at 138. “Off label” use refers to the practice of prescribing medications for unapproved
indications. 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 381.
36. Id.
37. Pasricha et al., supra note 19, at 141.
38. Id. at 143.
39. Linda Ganzini et al., The Prevalence of Metoclopramide-Induced Tardive Dyskinesia and Acute
Extrapyramidal Movement Disorders, 153 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1469 (1993); see also J.
Jankovic, Tardive Syndromes and Other Drug-Induced Movement Disorders, 18 CLIN.
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 197 (1995); L.G. Miller & J. Jankovic, Metoclopramide-Induced Movement
Disorders: Clinical Findings With a Review of the Literature, 149 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2486
(1989).
B. Conte—The Label
Metoclopramide is a potent dopamine-receptor blocking antiemetic agent
widely used to treat gastrointestinal symptoms and disorders such as vomiting,
nausea, diabetic gastroparesis and gastroesophageal reflux disease.31
Originally marketed under the brand name Reglan®, the drug is the only
FDA-approved drug for the treatment of diabetic gastroparesis, a condition in
which the stomach’s ability to empty is delayed.  Other uses of the drug32
remain “off label.”33
The Food & Drug Administration first approved metoclopramide for use
in 1979; and until the mid-1990s, the drug enjoyed popularity among
physicians for its ability to treat upper gastrointestinal tract symptoms.  In34
2000, the drug experienced a resurgence in use due to the withdrawal of a
competitor, cisparide, from the market.  Metoclopramide’s clinical efficacy35
is largely dose-dependent and best achieved with continuous dosages.  For36
this reason, the drug is often prescribed on a chronic basis by physicians, even
though according to the original label, only short-term therapy of less than 12
weeks is recommended.37
In its original label, Wyeth noted that the frequency of extrapyramidal
(neural) side effects associated with the drug was only 0.2%, or roughly 1 in
every 500 patients.  Later studies put the frequency closer to 29%.  Despite38 39
those studies, Wyeth did not update its label to reflect the additional studies,
nor did the company conduct any further safety studies regarding the long-
term use of the medication for the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia. Wyeth
caused an entry for Reglan® to be published in the PDR from 1980 through
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40. Foster v. American Home Products Corporation, 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994). Though the Foster
decision involved a question of state law from Maryland, other decisions from around the country are in
accord. See John and Jane Doe 2 v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 614 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
(dismissing claims against Eli Lilly & Co., who held original patent for thimerosal, for injuries suffered by
their minor child from the vaccine of another manufacturer who copied the Lilly patent under North
Carolina law).
41. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167.
42. Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 422 A.2d 16, 23 (Md. 1980).
43. In Conte, the court quickly distinguished cases cited by Wyeth arguing a similar requirement
in California courts by noting they applied only in products liability theories, and not in negligent
misrepresentation. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 101–02.
2001. See, e.g., Physicians’ Desk Reference 2713–16 (55th ed. 2001). No
other PDR monograph for any metoclopramide product, brand name or
generic, has appeared for any year. In Conte, the crux of plaintiff’s argument
rested on the premise that Wyeth could have, but ultimately failed to, warn of
the true association between metoclopramide and tardive dyskinesia post-FDA
approval without running afoul of the FDCA and FDA regulations.
III. FOSTER V. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION—THE LAND
BEFORE CONTE
Prior to the Conte decision, most courts in the country who examined the
issue of brand name liability aligned themselves with a case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Foster v. American Home
Products Corporation. Applying Maryland law, the Foster court affirmed a
lower district court ruling which held that the brand name manufacturer of
Phenergan® (promethazine) owed no duty to warn users of the equivalent
generic product of dangers associated with the medication.40
In that case, the Fosters, whose daughter died from taking the generic
form of Phenergan, brought suit against the drug’s pioneer. Although the
district court granted the pioneer’s motion for summary judgment on the
products liability claims because it had not manufactured the drug, it allowed
the Fosters to proceed on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, which was
later dismissed for a failure to show reliance.41
As noted by the court, Maryland law requires a plaintiff to prove that the
product in question was defective or in a defective condition, attribute that
product to a “seller” and prove that the defect proximately caused plaintiff’s
injury.  This is known as “product identification.”  Like many states,42 43
Maryland recognizes the existence of defect claims based upon
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44. Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 608 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Md. 1992); Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. 1976); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
45. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 171.
48. Id. at 169.
49. Id.; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984). See also Erickson v.
Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
50. Barson, 682 P.2d at 836. Specifics of what the manufacturer knew or should have known and
what was known in the medical community are questions of fact, rather than law, and are to be established
through expert testimony. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 9 (3d ed. 2007).
manufacturing, design and failure to warn defects.  However, in Foster, the44
appellate court noted that there were no recognized causes of action against
manufacturers for injuries arising from another manufacturer’s product.45
Therefore, the Foster court viewed the parents’ misrepresentation claim
as an attempt to circumvent Maryland’s product identification requirement.46
The court held that the pioneer owed no duty of care to the Fosters whatsoever
even though the Fosters had alleged it was foreseeable to the pioneer that
statements contained in its label could result in injury to generic users. In
describing the scope of any duty owed, the court refused to “stretch the
concept of foreseeability too far” and held that a pioneer or innovator had no
duty to generic patients because, in substance, they had no “right to rely” upon
instructions from the maker of the brand name drug.47
The court also noted that its decision did not leave plaintiffs like the
Fosters without a remedy against generic manufacturers even though they had
not been involved in the approval of the original label. The court argued that
generic manufacturers could “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning,
precautions or adverse reaction” or “delete false, misleading or unsupported
indications for use or claims for effectiveness” without having to obtain FDA
approval for such changes under the FDCA’s “Changes Being Effected”
provisions, located at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(2) and 314.97.  Further, the48
court rejected the notion that a generic manufacturer could not be liable for
misstatements in its label despite not having created any of those
misstatements, instead holding it to the knowledge and skill of an expert on
the product.  Thus, in Foster’s view, although both manufacturers—pioneer49
and generic alike—must warn about risks of which they either knew of or
should have known of, each can only be liable to plaintiffs who ingest their
respective products, even in instances where the labels remain identical.50
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51. These include Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-cv-03919 (DWF/SRN), 2008 WL 4724286, at
*5 (D. Minn. 2008); Buchanan v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., CV-2007-900065, slip. op. at 1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2008);
Westerlund v. Wyeth, Inc., No. MID L02174-05, slip op. at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2008 WL 2677051, at *4 (W.D. Ky. 2008); Wilson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-378-R,
2008 WL 2677049, at *4 (W.D. Ky. 2008); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-176-R, 2008 WL 2677048,
at *4 (W.D. Ky. 2008); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. App. 2008); Pustejovsky v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. 4:07-CV-103-Y, 2008 WL 1314902, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F.
Supp. 2d 1351, 1358–59 (N.D. Ga.); Green v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., CV-06-3917 ER, slip. op. at 1 (Ala.
Cir. Ct. 2007); Barnhill v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. Civ. A. 06-0282-CB-M, slip. op. at 4 (S.D. Ala.
2007); Leblanc v. Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ. A 04-0611, 2006 WL 2883030, at *6 (W.D. La. 2006); Goldych
v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 5:04CV1477, 2006 WL 2038436, at *3–*6 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Colacicco v. Apotex,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008); Sharp v. Leichus,
No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla.
App. 2007); Tarver v. Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3-04-2036, 2005 WL 4052382, at *2 (W.D. La. 2005); Kelly
v. Wyeth, No. CIV.A.MICV200303314B, 2005 WL 4056740, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005); Reynolds v.
Anton, No. 01A-76719-3, 2004 WL 5000272, at 9 (Ga. Super. Ct. 2004); Sheeks v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060, at *2 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004); Sloan v. Wyeth, No. MRS-L-1183-
04, slip op. at 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004); Block v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:02-CV-1077, 2003 WL 203067,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Flynn v. American Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001); Beutella v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-2372, 2001 WL 35669202, at *2 (Utah Dist. Ct.
2001).
52. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), judgment aff’d, 521 F.3d 253
(3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
53. Paxil belongs to a class of drugs known as Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”).
SSRIs are used by physicians for the treatment of depression and anxiety. On June 30, 2005, the FDA
issued a public health advisory warning of the potential for SSRIs to cause suicidal thoughts and behaviors
in patients on the medication. Id. at 519 n.2; see also FDA Public Health Advisory, Suicidality in Adults
Being Treated with Antidepressant Medications (June 30, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/
SSRI200507.
54. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 539–43.
Following Foster, a number of courts adopted its reasoning as decisive
of innovator liability.  After all, its logic seemed appealing—why should a51
manufacturer of one product be liable for injuries caused by another? For
instance, in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania dismissed an action against GlaxoSmithKline
(“GSK”), the brand name manufacturer of Paxil® (paroxetine hydrochloride),
on grounds of preemption and for lack of any duty owed to users of its generic
equivalent.  The plaintiff alleged that the medication caused his wife to52
commit suicide in her home some 22 days after ingesting the anti-depressant.53
Relying heavily on Foster for the basis of its opinion, the Colacicco court
distinguished Foster’s reliance on foreseeability as the main determinant in
duty from Pennsylvania’s “more nuanced” approach involving public policy.54
This decision seemed to add yet another argument in favor of Foster. With
respect to public policy, considerations included the societal importance of
encouraging the development of new and effective prescription drugs and of
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showing deference to the FDA as being uniquely qualified to determine
matters of drug policy and to decide labeling matters.  Of course, this55
deference in the latter part of the opinion was no doubt guided by the court’s
acceptance of a preemption argument, which, on appeal, was remanded by the
Supreme Court following its decision in Wyeth v. Levine.  But, the Colacicco56
court—like Foster—refused to extend liability to the brand name
manufacturer when the plaintiff’s wife had only ingested the generic version
of the drug.
With the handwriting on the wall, the generic manufacturers in Colacicco
tried to distance themselves from Foster by arguing that since they were no
longer parties in Foster at the time the opinion was delivered, that the court’s
imposition of a duty on their part for labeling inaccuracies was merely dicta.
The Colacicco court did not agree. Rather, it relied upon Foster’s reasoning
as persuasive, adopting it to create a duty on the part of the generic
manufacturer.  “Apotex [the generic manufacturer] is still a business,57
manufacturing drugs . . . not for some altruistic reason, but to realize a profit.
Apotex reaps the financial rewards . . . and it cannot hide from liability by
crying regulatory foul.”  The court did not believe it economically unfair to58
impose that duty on Apotex, as it is one imposed on manufacturers of any
product.  Thus, Colacicco like Foster, likely implies that the economic59
benefit generic manufacturers stand to gain from the sale of generic
medications is sufficient to levy liability against them for labeling deficiencies
regardless of the source of those deficiencies.
However, the importance of Colacicco’s interpretation of Pennsylvania
law may be limited, as its reasoning was later rejected in Clark v. Pfizer, Inc.60
In Clark, the state court decided that under Pennsylvania law, the brand name
manufacturer of the drug Neurontin® (gabapentin) could be liable for
misrepresentations to foreseeable plaintiffs in an off-label use case even
though there was no direct relationship between them, applying the same
nuanced policy factors from Colacicco. The court noted:
(1) The relationship between the purchasers of generic Gabapentin and these
defendant manufacturers . . . which would never have been purchased but for
defendant’s massive advertising campaign of misrepresentation.
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63. Jeffrey R. Pilkington & Shannon Wells Stevenson, Whose Label Is It Anyway? Liability for
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(2) Social Utility: There is no social utility to the defendant’s conduct, namely the
misrepresentation of scientific knowledge broadcast through conferences,
manipulation of medical data, medical literature and consulting contracts to
promote junk-science.
(3) The nature of the risks imposed is the use of medications for which no scientific
proof of effectiveness has ever occurred; and the foreseeability of the harm,
namely purchased no more productive than placebo treatment was the intention
of the advertising campaign.
(4) The consequences of imposing a duty upon the defendants . . . nothing greater
than the requirement that pharmaceutical advertising of drugs and promotion be
in accord with scientific knowledge and Federal law rather than market
requirements and profitability concerns.
(5) The overall public interest in the proposed solution that pharmaceutical companies
be required to obey the FDCA and only promote drugs for approved uses or foster
medical discussion for scientifically proven uses is the most salutary result
possible.61
IV. DRUG POLICY, APPROVALS AND LABELING CONCERNS
A. Brand Name v. Generic Policy
Although Conte and Foster differ in their approaches and conclusions
regarding innovator liability, the difference is based on more than just
variations of state law. Instead, in the difference is one of policy, based on
numerous factors, including: (1) the value of innovation placed upon drug
development by the reviewing court; (2) the extent to which the court views
the role of a generic competitor; (3) the continuing role and obligations of
vigilance over a drug’s label; and (4) the lens through which the court views
foreseeability. The proper weight to be assigned these factors by a court
requires more understanding of the generic pharmaceutical business than
either opinion provides.
Generic medications cost much less than their brand name counterparts.62
Virtually every segment of our health care system promotes generics over
brand names, except, of course, for pharmaceutical companies that research
and develop brand name drugs. Indeed, many states have laws that require
pharmacists to fill prescriptions with generic medications when available and
when not restricted by a physician’s orders.  Consumers have grown more63
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65. Id.
66. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
PROFILE 2006, at 2 (2006) [hereinafter PHRMA PROFILE].
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id.
70. See O’REILLY, supra note 50, at 3–29.
price conscious over the years, especially the elderly whose prescription drug
bills often compete with other necessities for living.  Today, pharmacies64
market a menu of low cost prescriptions, and insurers require a much lower
co-pay for generics than for brand name drugs.  At every level, there is an65
incentive to choose the generic over the higher cost alternative. But in some
cases, a generic is not yet available as the exclusive period in which a
manufacturer has to market its brand name drug has not expired.
This exclusivity, representative of a protected monopoly, is based upon
a very reasonable policy decision: that is, to encourage research and
development of new medications. After all, there are numerous reasons to
protect the investments made by brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers
in drug innovation. First, research and development of new medications is
incredibly expensive. On average, it takes approximately ten to fifteen years
of research to develop a new medication, with each approval costing about
$800 million.  For every 5,000 to 10,000 new drug compounds tested, only66
250 will enter preclinical testing, and only 5 will enter clinical trials.  In the67
end, out of the 5,000 to 10,000 compounds tested by a sponsor, FDA may only
approve one for marketing.  In 2005, the pharmaceutical industry invested68
some $51.3 billion in research and development costs to study new drugs.69
This enormous investment and expense is directly responsible for what
provides physicians with the ability to fight diseases and treat conditions that
were once considered to be life-threatening.
In recognition of the costly nature inherent in drug development,
Congress gave the pharmaceutical manufacturers a period of exclusivity70
following FDA approval in which they could market and sell their drugs
without fear of competition. Once the period of exclusivity concludes, generic
manufacturers enter the market essentially copying the drug and selling the
medication at substantial discounts. It is far beyond the scope of this article to
determine whether that policy should also ensure blockbuster profits for brand
name manufacturers and for how long. However, it is sufficient to recognize
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that once a manufacturer loses its exclusivity, it also loses its revenue stream
for that product almost entirely. Thus, exclusivity allows the pioneer to recoup
the costs of research and development and earn a reasonable profit by giving
the manufacturer a time period of exclusive sales while barring the FDA from
approving entry of a generic competitor.
To some, including the Foster and Colaccio courts, generic manufacturers
are viewed as scavengers.  They merely lie in wait for a drug to near the end71
of its exclusivity and then they file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) with the FDA to allow them to market a drug that is considered as
a “bioequivalent” to the pioneer.  In effect, the generic manufacturer is72
allowed to then ride the coattails of the pioneer.  And, because the FDA does73
not require any additional research as part of the ANDA, the generic
manufacturer typically does not conduct clinical trials apart from those
submitted to the FDA in the original sponsor’s New Drug Application
(“NDA”). Thus, the generic manufacturer is generally able to sell a copy of
the drug for whatever it costs to manufacture it.
Because of the relative ease with which a generic manufacturer is able to
enter the pharmaceutical market as opposed to that of an innovator, generic
drug manufacturing is a very successful business. This is true even despite
what is sometimes a huge price differential between a generic and brand name
version. For example, in 2007, generic prescriptions accounted for 69 percent
of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States, representing some 2.6
billion prescriptions.  The average retail price of a generic drug that year was74
$34.34 compared to the average brand name price of $119.51.  Nearly 79%75
of all of the drugs listed in the FDA Orange Book today have generic
equivalents.  In the future, the generic drug industry is expected to grow76
faster than the brand name industry in part due to increasingly cost-conscious
patients and research manufacturers’ shrinking drug pipeline.77
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B. Regulatory Approval of New Drugs
The FDCA prohibits persons from introducing any “new drug” into
interstate commerce that has not been approved by the FDA pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 355.  Before researchers may begin testing a new drug in human78
subjects, the manufacturer or sponsor must submit an Investigational New
Drug (“IND”) application to the agency for approval.  To protect human79
subjects against unreasonable risks, the IND contains laboratory findings and
the results of animal studies.  If the FDA approves the IND, the sponsor then80
moves on to three phases of clinical trials.  In Phase I, the medication is81
tested in a small group of subjects to determine safety and acceptable dosage,
typically numbering 20 to 100 volunteers.  From there, Phase II studies82
proceed with roughly 100 to 500 volunteers in controlled trials to determine
efficacy.  During this time, researchers continue to monitor for safety, side83
effects and optimal dosage.  In Phase III, 1,000 to 5,000 volunteers are84
enrolled in clinical trials to take the medication with researchers monitoring
for safety, efficacy and side effects against a comparator—a placebo.  The85
time required to complete all three phases of clinical trials presently averages
8.6 years.86
Assuming that the trials demonstrate safety and efficacy, the sponsor will
then file an NDA with the agency, containing results from the clinical testing,
as well as the content of the proposed label.  Usually, an NDA includes more87
than 100,000 pages of data for the agency to review which contains the
following:88
A. full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug
is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use;
B. a full list of the articles used as components of such drug;
C. a full statement of the composition of such drug;
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D. a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the
manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug;
E. such samples of such drug and of the articles used as components thereof as the
Secretary may require;
F. specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug, . . . ; and
G. any assessments required under section 355c of this title.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). By way of comparison, the requirements for an
Abbreviated New Drug Application can be found in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
FDA must approve the NDA unless the proposed new drug fails to meet
certain criteria, including whether clinical testing data and other information
show that the drug is safe and effective for “use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling” and whether
“based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, [its] labeling is false or
misleading in any particular.”  The FDA often uses independent advisory89
committees to consider the evidence and to vote on whether a new drug should
be approved for marketing.  Approximately 10 to 15 percent of drugs are90
rejected during this NDA review.  In 2008, the FDA approved a total of 2491
new medications, the most in three years.92
C. 1984: A Compromise in the Making—The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA (“Hatch-Waxman”)
The decade of the 1980s saw increasing regulatory and fiscal pressures
on government, particularly for the Department of Health & Human
Services.  These pressures included competing calls for lowering the price of93
prescription drugs while increasing the safety and efficacy of drugs by highly
regulating drug manufacturing.  At the same time, a related concern surfaced94
growing out of the 1962 amendments to the FDCA. Those amendments had
imposed a new requirement on drug approvals, that of demonstrating
efficacy.  This requirement slowed down the agency’s approval process95
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104. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
105. O’REILLY, supra note 50, at 13–166.
106. Id.; see also FOX & BENNETT, supra note 95, at v:
Each minor change in the legislation had a significant impact on one side or the other so that each
change had to be carefully balanced. One indication of the controversial nature and sensitivity of
the coalition was that there is almost none of the usual legislative history to this bill. There are no
Senate reports, for example, and floor statements were extremely limited and dealt with only a small
number of technical points. To really understand the intent of this legislation, one almost had to be
there as it was negotiated.
considerably, extending the time it took to grant approval of an application.96
By the time the drug eventually gained approval, manufacturers lost
substantial time in their patent exclusivity period.  At the same time, as97
NDAs became more complex and required more review for the brand name
manufacturers, the same requirements adversely affected development of
generic drugs.98
Following several studies and debates, a consensus also emerged
recognizing the fact that generic medications successfully hold down overall
drug costs.  But, it was not a consensus generated by public outcry, pro-99
consumer groups or even the very Congressmen who would ultimately
champion the proposed legislation that would ease the entry of generic
medications to market.  Rather, two competing economic groups within the100
pharmaceutical industry forged this consensus: the research manufacturers and
their generic counterparts.  These two groups worked side by side and101
developed a compromise, signing on key Senate and House members who
took the helm of the legislation.  Key Congressmen included House102
Democrat Henry Waxman of California and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch
of Utah, after whom the bill was named.103
As a result, the Hatch-Waxman bill provided for an abbreviated avenue
for generic manufacturers to come to market by relying upon the information
contained in the manufacturers’ original NDAs.  In exchange for relieving104
generic manufacturers of providing clinical data, FDA would now extend the
period of market exclusivity for pioneer manufacturers.  Consequently,105
Hatch-Waxman was promoted as a compromise bill between these two
competing industries.106
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Normally, federal patent laws provide inventors with a patent term of 20
years in which they can exclusively sell their invention.  However, with107
pharmaceuticals, it may take 10 to 15 years to bring a drug to market.  The108
pharmaceutical industry estimates that, on average, the average “effective
patent life” for medications is 11.5 years.109
After a brand name, NDA-approved drug loses its patent protection, a
generic manufacturer may file an ANDA, seeking FDA approval to market a
generic version of the brand name drug.  Prior to 1984, if a generic110
manufacturer desired to market its generic version of the drug, it had to submit
an NDA just like the manufacturer, showing evidence of safety and
efficacy.  After Hatch-Waxman, to receive ANDA approval, a generic111
manufacturer need not submit independent evidence of the drug’s safety and
efficacy; it need only establish the generic product’s “bioequivalence” to the
brand name listed drug.112
As discussed elsewhere, the labeling under the ANDA must be identical
to that used with the brand name drug.  After FDA approves an ANDA, the113
manufacturer is subject to most of the same statutory and regulatory
obligations as the brand name manufacturer, including the obligation to keep
its label current. Otherwise, the product might be considered misbranded
under 21 U.S.C. § 352.114
As soon as Hatch-Waxman implemented the generic approval process,
literally hundreds of abbreviated drug applications funneled through the
agency.  Many companies fresh to the highly regulated pharmaceutical115
industry and many from outside the United States began to compete for the
lucrative business of manufacturing generics.  Understandably, much of the116
early focus on generics was generated by the growth of the market following
Hatch-Waxman and was not devoted to more developed and complex
questions such as the interplay with products liability. In fact, the legislative
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history for the act does not contain any signal that either brand name or
generic manufacturers ever considered its liability implications. To some, that
lack of discussion may be seen as a reason not to impose liability for a generic
product onto an innovator. However, to others, it represents a conscious
decision by the research manufacturers to allow generic manufacturers to
obtain quick approvals by copying their drugs in return for a negotiated
position and longer period of market exclusivity. Suggesting that the position
enjoyed by generics is merely one of copying and scavenging for profit, as
Foster implies, ignores the very economic forces that created Hatch-Waxman.
Today, admittedly, some critics could question the success of the Hatch-
Waxman amendments to the FDCA, as low-cost generics have become widely
available while overall expenditures on prescription drugs have steadily
increased, being on par to the increases seen just prior to enactment of Hatch-
Waxman. For instance, in 2007, Americans spent more than $227 billion on
prescription drugs, an increase of 4.9% over 2006 expenditures.117
Comparatively, in 1984, Americans spent only $19.6 billion on prescription
drugs.118
Since Hatch-Waxman was passed, increases in year-over-year drug
spending have ranged from last year’s low of 4.9% to a high of 18.14% in
1999. These numbers compare to annual increases of 1.57% (1961) to 15.26%
(1983) in the 20 years prior to the legislation.  While there is anecdotal119
evidence of the impact of generics on seniors and the uninsured as they rely
on low cost prescriptions instead of expensive brand names, it appears that
efforts at keeping health care costs associated with pharmaceuticals in check
have proved unsuccessful. Although drug expenditures occupy only a small
portion of the total amounts spent on health care, it is one of the fastest
growing components.  In 2006, the annual rate of increase in spending was120
9% for prescription medications, compared to 7% in hospital care and 6% in
physician services.121
A recent watchdog report from the American Association of Retired
Persons found that brand name manufacturers raised prices on prescription
drugs far in excess of price increases for other consumer goods during the last
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year.  The report found that prices of brand name prescriptions used most122
widely by Medicare beneficiaries increased by 9.3 percent in the 12 months
ending with September 2009, an increase much higher than the rate of increase
observed during any of the prior seven years (i.e., 2002 to 2008).  In123
contrast, the report noted that the average price of generic drugs fell by 8.7
percent for the same period.  So, while the legislation has increased the124
number of generic medications available, it seems to have had little effect on
controlling overall prescription drug costs.
D. Duties Accompanying Drug Labels
Once a brand name drug or generic is approved by FDA, it must be
labeled in an approved form.  Because drug labels provide information to be125
used by physicians in prescribing and administering an approved drug, FDA’s
regulations detail the proper form and content for labeling.  As required, a126
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prescription drug will be accompanied by a label, often referred to as a
“package insert,” which includes drug indications, contraindications,
instructions for use, warnings and similar information. This prescription drug
information also appears in the Physicians’ Desk Reference (“PDR”).  A127
PDR entry, or monograph, consists verbatim a product’s FDA-approved
labeling.  Drug companies typically pay for PDR publication for their brand128
name drugs, but not for generic drugs.  Doctors often rely on the PDR for129
information to obtain necessary information about drug indications,
contraindications, warnings, proper dosage and administration, and the like.130
However, a label’s content is not permanent or set in stone. In certain
circumstances, a manufacturer is required to alter its labeling. FDA
regulations provide that approved drug “labeling shall be revised to include
a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a
serious hazard with a drug.”  Necessary label changes are generally made131
through a “supplement” submitted by the manufacturer to FDA.  Indeed,132
manufacturers are permitted to revise labels without prior FDA approval “to
add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction;
[and to] add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that
is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product.”  Thus, a133
manufacturer may revise a label to warn about hazards not on the current label
and, indeed, must attempt to do so whenever there is reasonable evidence of
an association between a drug and a serious hazard.
Despite oversight by the FDA and the demanding regulations associated
with drug labeling, a manufacturer is not shielded from tort liability simply
because the FDA approves its label.  Although the industry consistently134
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through “DTC” or direct-to-consumer advertising, e.g., television spots, magazine advertisements, etc. See
generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned
Intermediary Rules, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829 (1991); Tim S. Hall, Note, Bypassing the Learned
Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 473 (1993); Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d
1245 (N.J. 1999). Drug companies have come under increasing scrutiny for their DTC advertising, both
in terms of it being misleading as to the disclosure of risks and side effects and for driving up drug
expenses. The industry, on the other hand, estimates that DTC advertising only accounts for two percent
of the total U.S. spending on prescription drugs and amounted to $4 billion in 2004 compared to $47.6
billion spend on R&D that same year. See PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 66, at 22. For an excellent
discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine throughout the country, see State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson
Corp. v. Karl, 220 W. Va. 463 (2007).
argues in favor of this presumption, most courts view FDA’s regulations as a
“floor,” not a ceiling.  Hence, in failure to warn cases, there are usually135
allegations that the manufacturer became aware of substantial risks or adverse
side effects but chose not to amend its label.
E. The Learned Intermediary
Because prescription medications may only be obtained with a
prescription from a physician or by someone authorized to write prescriptions
under a physician’s supervision, many states require the manufacturer to
communicate risks and benefits of a particular medication to the patient’s
doctor, not the patient.  Known as the “learned intermediary,” this concept136
views the physician as an intermediary between the purchaser and the
manufacturer.  Accordingly, the doctor will evaluate the patient’s needs,137
assess the risks and benefits of potential medications in light of the patient’s
needs and susceptibilities and consider such in his or her orders.  The138
manufacturer’s disclosure of risks and benefits to the prescriber normally
discharges whatever obligation it has to otherwise warn users of its drugs.139
Within the context of the physician-patient relationship, potential liability for
a drug manufacturer is huge, as a single miscommunication with one physician
could harm a large class of patients.
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granted, vacated on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); see also Giles v. Wyeth, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d
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143. Id. Some plaintiffs will also file suit against the prescribing physician utilizing theories of
malpractice for the physician’s failure to adhere to the standard of care in considering the risks and benefits
associated with a medication. Similarly, some jurisdictions view the physician as an indispensable party
for jurisdictional purposes in drug product cases. See, e.g., Singleton v. Airco, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 467, 470
(D.C. Ga. 1978) (dismissing case against manufacturer for plaintiff’s failure to sue providers—resident
defendants—in action founded upon diversity). However, naming a physician seems highly counter-
productive when plaintiffs need the physician to be cooperative with the patient’s attorney regarding
inadequate warnings, sales tactics, e.g., aggressive detailing, etc., from the manufacturer.
144. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (Cal. 1958).
The learned intermediary defense is one recognized by virtually every
state.  To overcome the defense, a patient must show that the manufacturer140
failed to warn the physician of a risk not otherwise known to the physician and
that the failure to warn was the actual and proximate cause of the patient’s
injury.  An inadequate warning may also expose the manufacturer to141
liability.  Consequently, the patient must normally prove that but for the142
inadequate warning, the prescribing physician would not have prescribed the
medication.143
V. FORESEEABILITY—THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING CONTE
To understand how the Conte court arrived at its decision, it is not only
important to understand the independent nature of the tort of negligent
misrepresentation, but also instructive to recognize that Conte was based on
California law and was not an interpretation of some national precedent.
Historically, California courts did not recognize negligent misrepresentation
as distinct from negligence and fraud. Beginning in 1958 and continuing
through the 1960s, a series of important decisions began to frame an
individual action for negligent misrepresentation. First, in Biakanja v. Irving,
the California Supreme Court held that a negligence action could lie despite
a lack of privity between a plaintiff and defendant based on certain policy
factors.  These factors included the extent to which the transaction was144
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
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147. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710 defining actionable deceit as:
• The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
• The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for
believing it to be true;
• The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other
facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or,
• A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.
148. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. App. 1969).
149. Id. at 685.
attached to the defendant’s conduct and the policy of preventing future
harm.145
Subsequently, in Merrill v. Buck, the same California Supreme Court held
that landlords and realtors owed a duty of care to warn potential tenants of
concealed dangers where it was reasonably foreseeable that injury would
result without such warning.  Then, in 1969, a California Court of Appeal146
officially adopted the standard set forth in Restatement § 311 in Hanberry v.
Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 685 (Cal. App. 1969).147
Hanberry involved the claim of a consumer against the publishers of
Good Housekeeping Magazine (“GHM”) for having guaranteed the quality of
shoes sold in its magazine under its seal of approval. The shoes turned out to
be defective and caused Mrs. Hanberry to slip and fall on vinyl flooring,
injuring herself. Hanberry alleged that GHM was liable to her for negligently
misrepresenting the quality of the shoes. The court agreed, noting that “Hearst
ha[d] placed itself in the position where public policy impose[d] upon it the
duty to use ordinary care in the issuance of its seal and certification of quality
so that members of the consuming public who rely on its endorsement [were]
not unreasonably exposed to the risk of harm.”  The court further148
disregarded the requirement of privity between the party charged with the
misrepresentation and the plaintiff relying instead on public policy to define
the duty.149
Although Conte could be viewed appropriately as an extension of
Biakanja, Merrill and Hanberry toward foreseeable consumers who
sometimes lack a choice between manufacturers of the drugs they ingest, there
are some important considerations in interpreting the reach of the Conte
decision. First, because Conte was decided on summary judgment rather than
at trial, the court noted that certain policy implications, such as the “burdens,
98 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 4:73
150. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 107.
151. Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas: The Misunderstood
Tort, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 849–52 (2008).
152. The “information provider” is usually the defendant in misrepresentation and fraud cases and
supplies incorrect or insufficient information to the plaintiff.
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societal consequences, cost and insurance implications,”  were not fully150
explored, and the ultimate determination of Wyeth’s putative liability would
remain with a jury.
Secondly, and rather interestingly, the appellate court noted that during
the time that Conte was taking the drug, Wyeth had assigned its rights and
liabilities associated with the medication to Schwarz Pharma, Inc. (“Schwarz”)
in 2002. In its agreement with Schwarz, Wyeth agreed to indemnify Schwarz
for an unknown amount, and so the court dispensed with further analysis. The
use of such an agreement will be discussed later, as no doubt, pioneers may
search for ways to “pass the buck” on future potential liability for actions of
generic drug manufacturers. However, the presence of such agreement in
Conte and its relegation to the “back burner,” so to speak, suggests that a court
may look beyond such an assignment and lay liability on the innovator for its
conduct with respect to labeling as if it were a non-delegable duty.
When it comes to foreseeability, several standards have emerged
throughout the country to define how far a court will go in extending
foreseeability of a defendant’s conduct, including (1) the “near privity”
standard; (2) the foreseeability standard and (3) the Restatement standard.151
Under the near privity standard, a plaintiff must generally establish:
(1) the information provider  must have been aware that the misinformation would152
be used in a specific transaction or for a specific purpose;
(2) the information provider must have known that the misinformation would be
relied upon by a third party; and
(3) there must have been some conduct by the information provider linking it to the
third party that evidences the providers’ understanding that the third party would
rely on the misinformation.153
Most third parties cannot meet the near privity standard; typically, the
information provider does not directly communicate with the third party, and
any conduct by the provider is not more than merely incidental or collateral
to inducing reliance in the third party.  Under this standard, there would be154
no innovator liability to purchasers of generic drugs since there would be no
direct contact between the manufacturer and the ultimate patient. Even in
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cases of direct-to-consumer advertising, such communication could only be
described as incidental: prescription medications are only attainable under the
orders of a physician, who determines independently the appropriate course
of treatment for his or her patient.
Under the foreseeability standard, an information provider can be liable
to any third party whose reliance on a misrepresentation is reasonably
foreseeable.  This test of reasonable foreseeability is the most expansive of155
the three tests.  Arguably, the foreseeability standard is the standard that156
Conte relied upon to put forward its policy of innovator liability. In Conte, the
court adopted Restatement (Second) §§ 310 and 311 as its guide to defining
what was foreseeable to Wyeth.
Section 310 provides that:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the
truth of the representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or should
realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an
unreasonable risks of physical harm to the other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is
false, or (ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310.
Section 311 provides that:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results (a) to the other, or (b) to such third persons as the
actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care (a) in ascertaining
the accuracy of the information, or (b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965).
Notably, these sections of the Restatement lack any element of privity,
extending a duty to all foreseeable persons who may be deceived or misled by
the misrepresentation. These sections are also broader than the scope of
liability for strictly pecuniary losses resulting from negligent
misrepresentations under Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
This is the section upon which the third standard is based and one that the
majority of courts have followed.  It states:157
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(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that
he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created,
in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552.
Obviously, this standard is narrower than the foreseeability standard
because it limits liability to a specific transaction or to a substantially similar
one of which the provider is actually aware of and of which the provider
intends to influence.  Section 552, Comment (c) clarifies that relationship by158
noting that liability can only arise “when the defendant has a pecuniary
interest in the transaction in which the information is given.”  One might159
assume that this clarification would foreclose liability against the innovator
as there is no pecuniary relationship between it and a purchaser of a generic
medication. However, the simple fact that the innovator received no financial
consideration for the generic product does not mean the innovator lacks a
pecuniary interest.160
If the information, such as that that may be conveyed in a drug’s label or
monograph, is given in the course of the defendant’s business, then a
sufficient pecuniary interest would be involved, even though the defendant
receives no consideration for it at the time.  To establish a sufficient161
pecuniary interest, all that is needed is that the information provider must at
least provide information with the expectation of some indirect pecuniary
benefit, such as future business, referrals, or the abandonment or avoidance
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of a lawsuit.  Surely, providing information to a physician in the hopes that162
the physician will write prescriptions for the medication is sufficient and
within the pecuniary interest of the manufacturer.
Seemingly, in jurisdictions adopting anything but a near privity standard,
Conte should find support. Indeed, Conte’s analysis is not new. The
foreseeability of contact between a physician and a drug’s manufacturer and
its implications on duty has been recognized for decades. For example, in
Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche,  a plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a163
prescription drug for the wrongful death of his intestate alleging that the
manufacturer was liable for misrepresentations made to the plaintiff’s doctor
upon which the doctor had relied to write a prescription. The plaintiff alleged
causes of action based on fraud, negligence and implied warranty. The
defendant moved to dismiss all three claims in their entirety, but the trial court
disagreed with the manufacturer’s assertion that it could not be liable for the
woman’s death because it had not interacted with the woman. The court noted
that “[i]f a more direct nexus between the fraudulent misrepresentation and the
intestate is essential, it may be supplied by the circumstances that the
physician who prescribed the drug was acting on behalf of the intestate and
the fraud committed on the doctor was, therefore, a fraud upon the
intestate.”164
Interestingly, the Wechsler court relied upon the case of Marcus v.
Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  In Marcus, the administrator of a mother’s165
estate brought suit against the manufacturer of adult and child suppositories
for the death of the woman’s child. The action alleged negligence for failure
of the manufacturer to make a suppository safe enough for very young
children and for failing to provide adequate information to the prescribing
physician. The complaint did not allege misrepresentation or concealment as
possible alternative theories. The court concluded:
Moreover, it is difficult to see on what basis this defendant can be liable to plaintiff. It
made no representation to plaintiff, nor did it hold out its product to plaintiff as having
any properties whatsoever. To physicians it did make representations. And should any
of these be false it might be claimed with propriety that they were made for the benefit
of the ultimate consumers. But there is no such claim. The sole claim is not
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misrepresentation or even concealment, but a negligent failure to give adequate
information, and in some instances a failure to use adequate means to call attention to the
information given. It may be safely conceded that these allegations would be sufficient
if the product were sold to the public generally as a drug for which no physician’s
prescription was necessary. The situation alleged is materially different.
Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, 191 Misc. 285, 287, 77 N.Y.S.2d 508,
509–10 (N.Y. Sup. 1948) (emphasis added).
Although Wecshler and Marcus do not stand for the proposition that a
manufacturer can be liable for another’s product, these cases move the
analysis one step closer to the proverbial and ultimate bystander—or the
patient—based on an interaction with the patient’s prescribing doctor. Marcus
is also distinct in that, unlike Conte, no misrepresentation or concealment
claims were alleged in the suit. The allegations against Wyeth were not just
based on a negligent failure to warn. Marcus suggests, at far back as 1948,
that were such allegations to be presented, a drug manufacturer could be liable
to “ultimate consumers” for representations it made to their doctors, regardless
of privity with the consumers. Marcus suggests that a duty to disclose material
information about a drug product does, in fact, exist between the manufacturer
and doctors. That position is perfectly consistent with the learned intermediary
doctrine.
The problem of foreseeability in Foster is this: the court determined that
it is not foreseeable for a manufacturer to owe a duty to a purchaser of a
generic medication. However, the Foster analysis conflates the relationship
between foreseeability and duty. For a duty to arise, the question is not
whether the defendant foresaw owing a particular duty to a plaintiff, but rather
whether the defendant’s conduct creates a foreseeable risk to a foreseeable
plaintiff. Foster never answered the latter question; instead, the court
answered the question of whether it was foreseeable that a manufacturer
would owe a duty to a generic user.
Further, Foster’s premise is based on an unstated assumption that
prescription drugs are like other products.  Indeed, no one would ever166
suggest that another person sue Ford Motor Company for injuries sustained
from the use of a Chevrolet vehicle. Arguably, Foster states as much when it
rejects foreseeability of the manufacturer’s duty to generic consumers. With
prescription drugs, often there is no consumer choice between manufacturers.
Sometimes, the decision is dictated by the pharmacist, an insurer or someone
2010] CAVEAT INNOVATOR 103
167. Indeed, most states have drug-substitution laws allowing or requiring pharmacists to dispense
the generic version of a drug when available. Pilkington & Stevenson, supra note 63, at 45.
168. Foster, 29 F.3d at 169–70.
169. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197–98 (2009).
170. Foster, 29 F.3d at 171.
other than an informed consumer purchasing the product because of a sales
brochure regarding features of the brand name medication.167
Foster’s reasoning also relies on the recognition that generic
manufacturers may alter a label’s warnings and instructions, as they deem
appropriate, even without FDA approval. The case also suggests that generic
manufacturers—despite having to incorporate the label of the pioneer—should
not assume that the labels are “perfect.”  However, Foster virtually ignores168
the duty of the innovator to maintain the accuracy of its label as a continuing
duty.  Consequently, Foster views the duties of an innovator with respect to169
labeling as mutually exclusive with those of a generic.
More troubling, the Foster court’s analysis merges tort and products
liability concepts together to arrive at the conclusion that one cannot be liable
for a misrepresentation to another when there is no privity between the two
parties. In fact, in the entire opinion, only one sentence is devoted to
describing when a duty arises to a plaintiff for negligent misrepresentations.
The subsequent sentence answers the question summarily without any
analysis:
The duty required for the tort of negligent misrepresentation arises when there is “such
a relation that one party has the right to rely for information upon the other, and the other
giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.” (citations omitted). There is no
such relationship between the parties to this case, as Brandy Foster was injured by a
product that Wyeth did not manufacture.170
Not only does the opinion skirt the issue, but it seemingly resurrects
privity as an element to establish foreseeability and, thus, a duty of care.
Under such a requirement, even bystander liability in the most basic of
product liability actions would be foreclosed. In Conte, however, the
California appellate court noted the circularity of the argument and
distinguished it quickly.
But the Foster court’s analysis falters in the next step. As foreseeability is the principal
determinant of duty, the foreseeability of harm to consumers of the generic drug in
reliance on information disseminated about the brand name version should have some
significance in considering whether a duty of care arises in these circumstances. But
Foster does not address that point. Instead, it concludes—without further
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discussion—that no duty lies because “Brandy Foster was injured by a product that
Wyeth did not manufacture.” But that is the very question posed—not the answer.171
At present, approximately 34 courts in 19 states have followed Foster’s
reasoning.  Nine of these have occurred following the decision in Conte; of172
these, though, none have been extremely helpful in filling the foreseeability
gap left by Foster. Instead, these cases have simply adopted Foster’s
reasoning without scrutiny. For instance, Huck v. Trimark Physicians
Group,  contained no substantive discussion of Conte or of brand name173
liability as the plaintiffs filed no opposition. Precedent from another pre-Conte
case in the same circuit bound the court in Cousins v. Wyeth Pharmaceutical,
Inc.  In Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc.,  the court did not address either Conte or174 175
Foster. Instead, the federal district court refused to render an opinion absent
a ruling from the state’s highest court on the issue, noting that other
dispositive issues existed in the case, such as the lack of causation and
plaintiff’s failure to meet the state’s product identification requirement. In
Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc.,  the court noted that Nevada, unlike California, does176
not recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation in personal injury cases
because Nevada does not recognize sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Further, in Fields v. Wyeth, Inc.,  there was no product177
identification, and the court upheld Arkansas’ exclusivity of remedy rule in
products liability cases. Similarly, in Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc.,  a North178
Carolina district court from the same circuit as Foster, followed its leader and
refused to allow the plaintiff to sidestep her exclusive remedy in products
liability. The court in Burke v. Wyeth, Inc.,  held that Texas’ remedy for179
products-related injuries is also exclusive and followed earlier Texas
precedent on the issue. In Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.,  the180
district court, while dismissing the case, refused to go so far as to say that
New Hampshire would not recognize innovator liability. Finally, in Meade v.
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Foster’s language to avoid extending foreseeability too far but offered no new
analysis.
Clearly, after Foster and Conte, regardless of the source of a particular
medication, both an innovator and a generic have continuing duties to
maintain the accuracy of the relevant drug’s label as long as the medication
remains on the market. Both have potential liability for their failure to do so,
and liability should be shared in relative proportion based upon the facts of the
case. In Conte, this did not happen because the generic manufacturers escaped
liability on the misrepresentation theories as they had not participated in
making any representations to Conte’s physician. Her doctor simply did not
rely on their information, never interacted with their sales representatives and
did not choose the manufacturer of the patient’s drug. The physician wrote the
prescription which was substituted by the pharmacist. Nonetheless, the fact
that a generic manufacturer copies another’s label should not relieve the first
of its own liability for failing to adequately disclose information in its original
label or via a supplemental label change later.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON CONTE—POTENTIAL DEFENSES
Although Conte initially summoned a loud outcry from the
pharmaceutical defense bar, it has not had the catastrophic impact that many
commentators had predicted, due in large part to existing differences among
states’ products liability laws. If any impact is to be realized, perhaps it will
be in arguments advanced in courts that have yet to decide the issue. Or,
perhaps Conte may serve as the ultimate consideration in a list of many factors
to be weighed by plaintiffs’ lawyers before choosing where to file a generic
manufacturer case if given the option. 
Prior to Conte, several states adopted statutory restrictions on actions that
could comprise a products liability action. These restrictions arguably
foreclose an outcome similar to Conte in these jurisdictions.  These states,182
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Co., 2006 WL 2038436 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
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184. Id. at 1060–61.
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Blog (Feb. 23, 2009), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/search/label/Conte.
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like Maryland, require, as an element of proving a prima facie products
liability case, “product identification.” Under that concept, a plaintiff must
successfully demonstrate “that the actual product manufactured or distributed
by the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff.”  Thus, as long as a court183
views the action as products related, there is little chance it will adopt the
reasoning in Conte.
For example, in Fields v. Wyeth, a federal district court relied on
Arkansas state law and required the plaintiff, in order to maintain her action
against the company, prove that the metoclopramide she took came from
either Wyeth or Schwarz, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s argument that the
action sounded in negligent misrepresentation. In its analysis, the court
assumed that even if it proved foreseeable to Wyeth (and Schwarz) that
information provided to the plaintiff’s physician might be relied upon to
prescribe a generic version, the plaintiff could still not meet her burden of
product identification to prove requisite proximate causation.184
Further, in order to escape extensions of Conte to certain cases, some
within the pharmaceutical defense bar have suggested the use of disclaimers
in labels to notify physicians and others that the warnings and instructions
found in the brand name label do not apply to generic versions of the drug.185
For a number of reasons, however, the FDA will not allow the disclaimers and
will reject, in practice or in theory, the proposed label.  Still, the186
manufacturer could argue that in rejecting its proposed label or change that the
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191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m “Warranty”:
The consumer’s cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person
from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement,
whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the
product into the consumer’s hands.
FDA’s decision preempted state tort claims under Wyeth v. Levine.  In187
Levine, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected federal preemption of a failure-to-
warn claim absent clear evidence that the FDA had either rejected proposed
language or would not have approved stronger language in the drug’s label.188
While technically appealing, this argument has weaknesses.
First, it elevates form over substance and potentially misreads Levine. A
disclaimer as to applicability of a label merely distinguishes between
manufacturers, not between a drug’s side effects, risks or benefits. It is hard
to see how a disclaimer as to the source of the medication would provide
protection against a claim that the pioneer had knowledge or information
regarding risks and benefits that should have been included in the original
label or in a supplemental label, but failed to provide it. Secondly, Levine
notes that a manufacturer has an ongoing responsibility to ensure accuracy of
its label content at all times while the drug is marketed,  including situations189
in which a drug’s sponsor conducts new analysis of data previously submitted
to the FDA which shows different risks or greater severity or frequency of
adverse events.  This post-FDA approval duty would be no less applicable190
in Conte, as the risks and frequency of tardive dyskinesia became known and
studied after the FDA approved Reglan®.
In addition, the use of disclaimers as an affirmative defense is based in
contract and warranty theories of law rather than in tort law. Even then, there
is a strong recognition that such defenses are not applicable under strict
products liability theories.  With negligence, public policy may dictate191
against disclaiming liability when facts surrounding the disclaimer, such as,
risks of a particular drug, remain undisclosed. On the other hand, were a
manufacturer to raise an argument that the disclaimer would give rise to
questions in the prescribing physician’s mind or to the consumer about the
reliability of such a label, a factual issue could be created as to both the actual
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or justifiable reliance of either thereon. However, the issue of actual or
justifiable reliance thereon is generally a question of fact rather than law.192
For this question to be answered, it would most likely be submitted to a jury,
resulting in lengthy and expensive litigation of the case through trial, as
opposed to resolution at the summary judgment stage.
Another practical option for pioneers is to consider assigning the rights
to a medication to a generic competitor once the exclusivity period concludes
and the drug goes generic. In theory, the manufacturer would be also assigning
liability for its original responsibilities with respect to the drug’s label,
notwithstanding the generic manufacturer’s existing duty to update the label
as discussed above. In practice, however, this option may prove difficult. First
of all, in Conte, Wyeth had assigned the rights to Reglan® to Schwarz
Pharmaceuticals in 2002. The agreement, however, contained an
indemnification clause running in Schwarz’s favor, presumably due to
Schwarz’s insistence on such a provision. The indemnification clause seems
a prudent provision to any such contract since the clinical trials and post-
marketing surveillance data conducted by the pioneer are not conducted in the
presence of or by the generic manufacturer. Additionally, although an
assignment of liability might curtail prospective labeling issues for the
innovator, it would not necessarily protect the innovator from claims arising
from its negligence prior to any assignment. Such an argument would be
contrary to law and to policy promoting safety and efficacy of medications by
allowing manufacturers to later waive or release themselves from their own
liability.
To protect itself from potential liability, a pioneer might also consider
voluntary withdrawal of the new drug application (NDA). In other words, the
manufacturer would cease production and sale of the medication as the end of
the exclusivity period nears and generics are due to come to market. This way,
generics would have nothing to copy and no label to rely upon. Withdrawing
the NDA would certainly obliterate any claim of justifiable reliance, necessary
to prove a misrepresentation case. However, Hatch-Waxman anticipated these
strategies and provided an exception to withdrawal that would allow generic
manufacturers to continue marketing a generic version so long as the original
drug was not withdrawn for safety and efficacy reasons.  Accordingly, the193
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act requires a determination as to whether the drug
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was withdrawn for safety and efficacy reasons when the withdrawal occurs
prior to approving an ANDA or while there are approved ANDAs on the
market.  Thus, the withdrawal of an NDA does not necessarily prevent a194
generic manufacturer from continuing to market the generic medication. In the
event the FDA determines the drug was withdrawn by the innovator for safety
and efficacy reasons, it will publish a notice in the Federal Register, initiate
a proceeding in accordance with 21 C.F.R. § 314.153(b), and the drug will be
removed from the list under 21 C.F.R. § 314.162. Granted, that regulatory
action might prevent further marketing of any generic version of the drug, but
it would also foreclose any sales of the drug by the innovator while notifying
the public and the plaintiffs’ mass torts bar of undisclosed safety and efficacy
issues prompting the drug’s withdrawal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some suggest that it is unfair to expose innovators to liability in generic-
only cases, especially when innovators gain no economic benefit from the sale
of the generic product. However, this position ignores the basic reality that,
for years, an innovator has been able to exclusively market an expensive
medication, reaping a handsome return on its investment and, in some cases,
billions of dollars of profit. This author desires to avoid the suggestion that
there is any harm in earning a profit, however profit and responsibility come
hand in hand. Perhaps greater responsibility for label changes should lie with
the innovator since the innovator originally conducts the clinical trials and
monitors the drug through post-marketing surveillance.
In addition, failure to warn and misrepresentation cases such as Conte
sound in negligence, not strict liability. Liability would not exist were it not
for negligence on the part of someone in formulating the label. Why should
the manufacturer, the party originally responsible for having either placed
erroneous information in its label or, worse, having withheld information from
its label be exonerated simply because a generic manufacturer reproduced the
product using the same active ingredient and same warning label? If risk is to
be borne by the party best capable of mitigating that risk, it should not be a
given that the innovator should be free of potential liability. That said, these
cases are not open and shut, as causation and reliance remain significant
obstacles.
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Some may argue that it is fundamentally unfair to the innovator if courts
find preemption of labeling claims on the part of generic manufacturers.195
While this argument is meritorious, it does not alter the economic superiority
the innovator has enjoyed over the years. It also disregards the Supreme
Court’s position in Levine as generic manufacturers retain their obligation to
update labels under the Changes Being Effected provisions of 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70. Moreover, a balance can and should be struck with respect to
contribution. That is, any factual determination by a court as to ultimate
liability should be determined by a trier of fact, apportioning the appropriate
fault to the innovator and the generic.
Conte’s finding does not force brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers
to become the insurers of generic manufacturers. By sharing liability to update
drug labels, both the pioneer and the generic manufacturer remain potentially
liable to the plaintiff. Conte did not create any new duty in this regard.
Pioneers are already responsible for maintaining the label while their drug is
on the market. This policy encourages, rather than insulates, drug companies
to provide accurate information in their labeling throughout the entire life
cycle of the medication.
Arguments that decry fundamental unfairness based on the lack of an
ability to control the manufacturing process of another competitor are wholly
irrelevant to the issue because negligent misrepresentation theories are based
in information deficiencies, not manufacturing or design defects. Arguments
that it is irresponsible for physicians to seek legally binding information about
a drug from a company that does not itself produce, control, or profit from the
sale of that drug are likewise misplaced. Oftentimes, the physician does not
know whose product will be prescribed, nor does the physician compare
specific factors, e.g., engine size, gas mileage, color, etc., such as one might
compare in choosing an automobile. To the doctor, and to the FDA, all
generics are bioequivalent to the innovator’s drug.
Indeed, Foster’s rationale should be limited rather than serve as the model
for future generic-only cases. Not only does Foster choose to analyze the
foreseeability of a duty rather than the foreseeability of risks by a defendant’s
conduct, but it suggests that generic drug manufacturers should bear not only
the cost of liability associated with their product, but also that of the
innovator’s negligence in the original labeling. While this policy favoring the
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assumption of such a risk is noteworthy, it is somewhat short-sighted because
it protects the very innovator who may be responsible for the misleading label
on the notion that it can no longer turn a profit on a medication once a generic
version enters the market. This position ignores the likelihood that the
innovator has potentially made billions of dollars off of the ability to sell its
drugs for years without any competition, earning possibly more from the sale
of the brand name drug than the generic manufacturer can ever hope to make.
After all, the innovator is able to name its own price with impunity. Why
should Foster provide such protections to a high-priced product at the expense
of consumers? Why should our judicial policy condone favoring a product that
is no longer commercially viable due to competition?
Foster illustrates further weakness in its failure to consider the learned
intermediary doctrine. If providing the risks and benefits of a particular
medication to a physician discharges the manufacturer’s duty to warn or
inform patients of the same, are generic manufacturers also relieved of the
duty to warn? After all, it is commonly accepted that the manufacturer owes
the duty to warn or inform to the physician, not the patient. Has the
manufacturer thus assumed a duty of care to the physician of a generic patient
who relies on the brand name manufacturer’s label? Furthermore, what of the
generic manufacturer’s duties to warn? Absent the need for a label change,
there is nothing new to be disclosed; thus, no duty on the part of the generic
manufacturer to even warn the physician in the first instance. The generic
manufacturer must rely upon the validity of the innovator’s label. And
notwithstanding the accuracy of that label, who must the generic manufacturer
warn, the patient, the pharmacist, or the physician? Indeed, Foster and its
progeny seem to criticize generic manufacturers for being scavengers, but
neglect to analyze the extent of duties owed by them. According to Foster,
“the party that actually controls the manufacturing and labeling of the product
in question, and enjoys the profit of its sale, should bear legal liability for
resulting injury.”  Such a position sounds in strict liability more so than in196
negligence.
It is critically important to consider the duty owed by the generics
manufacturers. In failure to warn cases, it seems that liability could only exist
if the plaintiff shows that the generic manufacturer possessed information
about a drug that warranted label revisions, but chose instead not to change its
label. If constructive knowledge proved enough, then would not the innovator
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also remain liable for not changing the label? These implications present
serious hurdles to Foster’s reasoning.
In the end, Foster, as is, could be utilized to stand for judicially created
immunity of the innovator. In essence, after the innovator’s exclusivity period
ends and a drug goes generic, an innovator could never be liable for failure to
warn in its label, even though it had actual knowledge of the need for such a
warning, unless the plaintiff could prove that she took the brand name
medication and that it caused or contributed to her injuries. This policy works
well for nearly all other products, but it ignores the rather unique world of
pharmaceutical products and the FDCA’s labeling regime. Under this policy,
there would be no incentive for the manufacturer to ever amend its label, as
generics would bear absolute liability for the innovator’s failure. The only
consequence would then be the result of FDA enforcement action to require
a label change on the part of the innovator.
Foster conflates the questions of duty and with proximate causation.
These issues should remain as distinct addends of the equation. The concept
of duty concerns itself with requirements on a person “to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.”197
Proximate cause, on the other hand, concerns itself with whether the
defendant’s “conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the
defendant should be legally responsible.”198
As to duty, both the statutory framework and case law support the notion
of a duty upon drug manufacturers—regardless of their position in line—to
maintain the accuracy and adequacy of labels for products they sell. This duty
is arguably perpetual—existing until manufacturers, both innovator and
generic, are no longer involved in the commercial sale of that medication. This
duty should then run to any foreseeable plaintiff for any foreseeable risk that
conduct causes. If a manufacturer then breaches that duty, the court moves on,
like with any other claim, to a question of causation, both factual and legal.
Legal or proximate causation is not really a question of causation, but one of
policy, a question of how far to extend liability or the responsibility for the
conduct of the defendant.199
This is where the battle in these types of cases should be fought.
However, proximate causation in this application, one that especially relies
upon the foreseeability of harm and the extent to which we are willing to
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stretch it, should never be a proxy for duty.  Unfortunately, that is how200
Foster characterized proximate causation and emphasized the elements for
negligent misrepresentation. The court stated:
1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false
statement;
2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted on by the plaintiff;
3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statements,
which if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
4) the plaintiffs, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and
5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.
Foster, 29 F.3d at 171 (emphasis in original).
In collapsing duty with causation, Foster has limited its potential to
answer the questions left open by Conte, such as whether the physician
exercised justifiable reliance on the PDR label, and whether, as a matter of
proximate cause and not duty, it makes sense to hold the innovator liable.201
The policy Foster promotes is one-sided, seeming to exhibit more a distaste
for the position of the generic manufacturer, suggesting that the generic
manufacturer is a type of plagiarist while Congress and the pharmaceutical
industry itself have authorized the generic manufacturer’s very conduct by
statute.
Before innovators become too concerned with the ramifications of Conte,
it should be noted that the decision is not an ultimate one, but one on summary
judgment. A trier of fact will still have to determine whether such a duty
actually existed on their part to generic plaintiffs. In Conte, the doctor testified
that he had reviewed the PDR for Reglan at some point in his residency, years
before treating the plaintiff and, further, relied upon his research of the drug
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in deciding to prescribe the drug to the plaintiff. If a jury accepts that such
reliance is justifiable, even given the intervening medical articles in the
meantime, perhaps liability rests with the manufacturer, innovator and generic
alike. Or, perhaps the doctor’s reliance is not justifiable, and the doctor bears
an increased responsibility for having not kept current with knowledge within
the field of medicine. Regardless, questions surrounding the doctor’s research
should remain distinct from the concept of duty. Otherwise, we shortcut to the
answer , but leave an industry wondering just where liability to update labels
should stand once a generic comes to market.
Between Conte and Foster lies the notion of joint liability and concurrent
causation: liability if the original label contained a misrepresentation and the
subsequent negligence of the generic.
The argument that the negligence of defendants . . . in failing to warn plaintiff and in
allowing the dangerous condition of the premises to continue was an intervening force
to break the chain of causation of the negligence of the realtors is answered by the settled
rule that two separate acts of negligence may be the concurring proximate causes of an
injury.
Merrill v. Buck, 375 P.2d 304, 311 (Cal. 1962). This naturally leads to
questions as to whether negligence on the part of the generic is one of
intervening or superseding negligence. Thus, while liability might exist for the
generic, as Foster urges, the pioneer is not relieved of its negligence. This
result is not entirely unfair because it allows for contribution from each party
as to the amount of negligence while preserving the plaintiff’s ability to
recover for her injuries. The result also illustrates sound policy because it
shifts the burden to those with an economic incentive, past or present, to
disclose facts and risks as they are discovered as opposed to otherwise hiding
such facts and risks from the public and their physicians. Moreover, the result
also reflects sound medicine given that some adverse reactions and side
effects may not manifest themselves for years.
If one views Conte as a decision that holds brand name manufacturers
liable for all injuries sustained by patients of generic drugs, then the Conte
ruling is an expansive and, no doubt, troubling pill for manufacturers to
swallow. This is especially so from the lens of a warranty action, but less so
for an action based in tort because even though a company may decide to not
market a medication or has watched its patent expire and its revenues for that
medication dwindle to nothing, the policy that patients should not be exposed
to unreasonable risks of any medication as long as it remains on the market
deserves protection.
